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1. The reference to "urban legend" is not based upon any character or the storyline in
the movie URBAN LEGEND. (TriStar Pictures, Inc. 1998). Moreover, the illustration set forth
in the accompanying text is provided solely to explain how the discovery issue, that is the
subject of this article may arise in a federal district court that has yet to adopt the rule
governing the discovery of impeachment information in the personnel files of federal agents
involved in a particular case that exists in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. These rules and principles are discussed in the accompanying text. Accordingly,
nothing herein is to be construed as an opinion of the author about the illustration provided
or the individuals involved in the anecdote case. The author has the privilege of having
regular contact with the attorneys and the court involved in the illustrative case. These
individuals represent the best and brightest that the legal system offers. With these comments
in mind, describing the defendant as an "urban legend" in the illustration provided herein is
attributable to the case United States v. Walker, No. 96-CR-004 (E.D. Wis. 1996), where the
Deputy United States Attorney called Defendant Walker an "urban legend." See Dave
Daley, Massive DrugRing's Leader Gets Life Terms, MILW. J.SENTINEL, Apr. 5,1997, at 1A.
Martin E. Kohler, Esq. was the attorney defending Jerry Walker in that case. The author was
co-counsel with Martin Kohler and is a member of Kohler's law firm, Kohler & Hart LLP.
No reference to the Walker case herein represents the opinion of Jerry Walker, Attorney
Martin E. Kohler, or the law firm of Kohler & Hart LLP. All references to the Walker case
are a matter of public record and found in the court file in the district court and the published
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he conducted a reign of terror in the city for years until the government,
after prior attempts, gathered enough evidence to bring him down. The
government alleged that he was the leader of a continuing criminal
enterprise (CCE) that involved itself in the sale of cocaine throughout
the United States.! As in many drug conspiracy cases, most of the coopinion United States v. Coleman, 1999 U.S App. LEXIS 12015. The case was extensively
covered in the media. Those references are noted above and infra.
As noted supra, the labeling of Walker as an "urban legend" was not based upon any
character or the story in the movie by the same name. References in the case law being
confused with characters or storylines in the movies are not new. The Honorable Terrence T.
Evans of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, noted in United States v.
Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 890 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997):
When [the defendants] arrived in Jamaica they faced more difficulties. Because
of hurricane damage, the fishing canal leading to the meeting place-"Rick's Cafe"
n2-was too narrow to accommodate the "Yes I Am."
n2 This "Rick's Cafe," unlike the famous "Rick's Cafe," was on water. Recall the
lines:
Humphrey Bogart (Rick Blaine, the owner of "Rick's Cafe"): I came to Casablanca
for the waters.
Claude Rains (Capt. Louis Renault): The waters?
What waters? We're in the desert!
Bogart: I was misinformed.
Id.
2 See United States v. Walker, Crim. Action No. 96-CR-004, 1996 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Wis.
1996). Jerry Walker and his associates were charged in an eleven-count superseding
indictment alleging violations of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846 and 848, cocaine trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). See Dave Daley, Daytime
Execution of Boy Began Drug King's Downfall, MILW. J. SENTINEL, June 9, 1997, at 1A.
These charges stemmed from a drug conspiracy in 1988 to 1995 in which Walker was the
leader. Walker and two co-defendants were tried before a jury beginning on October 28,
1996. The government presented evidence describing drug busts at residences, the airport
and controlled buys of cocaine on the streets of Milwaukee. See id. Moreover, coconspirators testified about Walker's involvement in the conspiracy. See id. On November
14, 1996, a jury found that Walker was guilty on all counts. See Dave Daley, Convicted Drug
Lord Could Get Life Term, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 1996, at lB. Walker was
subsequently sentenced on April 4, 1997 to two life terms in prison as well as 240 years for the
substantive drug dealing counts. At pre-sentencing, Walker objected to the sentence
recommendation that he be sentenced in both the CCE count and the substantive predicate
acts counts in violation of recent case law. The district court imposed the sentence on all
counts. On appeal, the government and Walker conceded this error at law. The victory was
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defendants cut a deal with the prosecutors.' In exchange for testifying
against the kingpin, the government recommended to the federal district
court judge that the cooperating defendants be sentenced far below
what the federal sentencing guidelines dictated given their criminal
history, offense conduct, and relevant conduct as members of the drug
trafficking organization.4 Accordingly, of the defendants indicted in this
illustration, all but three plea bargained their cases on the condition that
they testify against the kingpin, while the others avoided prosecution by
agreeing to testify against him.5
During the course of the trial, one of the assistant United States
attorneys prosecuting the case announced that he might have potentially
"material" information that he might have to disclose to the defense.6
The prosecutor told the district court judge that the genesis of the
information was from the personnel file of one of the federal agents
involved in the case and that he was aware of the fairly recent case,
hollow; Walker still had a life sentence. See Daley, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See i.The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for a reduction of sentence
based upon substantial assistance provided by defendants in criminal cases. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1. Under section 5K1.1, federal district court
judges can depart from the sentence range calculated by the Sentencing Guidelines matrix if a
defendant has provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense." Id.
5. See supra note 1. Judge Jose Cabranes has critically discussed the federal sentencing
guidelines in Kate Smith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 NWv. U. L. REV. 1247 (1997); see generally Jose A. Cabranes, Editorial,
Incoherent SentencingGuidelines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at All.
6. There are constitutional and statutory rights to discovery in criminal cases. Under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and case law, a defendant in a criminal case has the
right to obtain what has been termed "material" information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
Moreover, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the government is required to
provide a defendant with exculpatory evidence within the government's control "where the
evidence is material.., either to guilt or to punishment," irrespective of the prosecutor's
good or bad faith. Accordingly, impeachment evidence falls within the ambit of the Brady
rule as evidence that is favorable to the accused. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676 (1985). Nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, including impeachment evidence, violates
a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See id.at 675. Evidence is material to the
defense if it is determined that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at
682, 685; United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 818 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, a "reasonable probability" has been defined
as information sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682-85. Materiality is not satisfied, however, by "the mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome
of the trial .... " United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). The discovery rules and
standards that apply to federal criminal cases are more fully discussed infra in Part I of this
article.
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Kyles v. Whitley,7 and requested that the trial court examine the
information in camera.8 The defense argued that if the prosecutor
thought that the information was material, then it is and it should be
disclosed at once.9 The trial court ultimately decided to review the
information in camera. After the district court reviewed the file, the
court decided that the information was not material and not subject to
disclosure by the government to the defendants.
This example, used only for illustrative purposes and making no
judgment or comment about the case or any of the individuals involved,
highlights the procedural conundrum that exists in the handling of
marginal discovery issues in which varying local rules dictate outcomes.
If these events had occurred in a federal district court included within

the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the prosecutor would have been responsible for addressing this
problem much sooner in the proceedings. As is more fully explained
infra, case law from that federal circuit does not require that the
7. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). Justice Souter, writing for the majority in the Kyles decision,
noted that prosecutors have a broad responsibility to discover exculpatory evidence that may
exist outside of their case file. Accordingly, prosecutors have an ongoing duty to learn of
"any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police." Id. at 437; see also Lis Wiehl, Keeping the Files on File Keepers: When
Prosecutors are Forced to Turn Over the Personnel Files of Agents to Defense Lawyers, 72
WASH. L. REV. 73, 104 n.130 (1997); Cynthia L. Corcoran, Note, Prosecutors Must Disclose
Exculpatory Information When the Net Effect of the Suppressed Evidence Makes It
Reasonably Probable that Disclosure Would Have Produced a Different Result, 26 SETON
HALL L. Rev. 832 (1996). Both of these articles, and others that are listed infra, provide a
comprehensive discussion of the Kyles case and the implications of Justice Souter's opinion.
Moreover, a discussion of the import of the Kyles opinion is discussed more fully infra in the
context of disclosure of material evidence contained in the personnel files of agents and
officers.
8. The United States attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin sought to invoke
himself into the trial efforts of his deputy and assistant United States attorneys by testifying
about the veracity of one of the government's investigative agents who testified in the Walker
trial. See Dave Daley, FederalProsecutor,Drug Agent in Ugly Dispute, MILW. J. SENTINEL,
Jan. 5, 1997, at 2A; Dave Daley, Schneider's Pressureon Witness Confirmed Agent Said U.S.
Attorney PushedHim on Complaint, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1998, at 1A. The Honorable
Rudolph T. Randa reviewed the information in camera and determined that it was neither
relevant nor material. Id. Accordingly, the information was not disclosed to the defense
during the trial, but came out in the media after the fact.
9. Attorneys filed a pretrial motion seeking material information contained in the
personnel files of agents and officers involved in this illustrative case. That motion relied
heavily upon Kyles and Ninth Circuit procedures which require disclosure of such
information without the defendant having to demonstrate that the information is material.
The motion was the first of its kind since Kyles was decided to be filed in the Eastern District
of Wisconsin. The thought was that Kyles would broaden the scope of this type of discovery.
It did not. Both the magistrate and the district court denied the defense request.
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defendant make a showing of materiality upon making a request for the
disclosure of information contained in an agent or officer's personnel
file to be informed of such information by the prosecutor as part of the
pretrial discovery process.'0 Simply asking for the information requires
the government to undertake a review of the personnel files of agents
and officers involved in the investigation to ascertain if there is
potentially discoverable information." The Seventh Circuit and some of
its sister circuits, however, require that the defendant make a showing
that the information is material to the defense in order to obtain
information in an agent's or officer's personnel file. 2 Accordingly, this
anomaly in the federal discovery standards has created an uneven field
of play in federal district courts across the land.
On April 19, 1995, however, the United States Supreme Court may
have provided the framework for the discovery of information
contained in the personnel records of agents and officers investigating
federal criminal cases when it released its decision in Kyles v. Whitley. 3
Members of the criminal defense bar hailed the decision as a watershed
opinion that would expand the discovery rights of criminal defendants
and impose a duty upon federal prosecutors to look beyond their case
file to learn of any material information in the possession of cooperating
law enforcement agencies that is discoverable in a given case."
Moreover, the academy seized upon the ruling by turning out law review
articles discussing the importance of Kyles to federal criminal procedure
and constitutional rights. 5 The idea is that the language provided in the
Kyles case, while dicta, would be the touchstone from which the varying
standards in the federal circuits governing the disclosure of information
10. See United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1991) (The government has
a duty to examine personnel files of those witnesses employed by the federal government and
part of the investigation team expected to testify at trial upon a defendant's demand for the
production of the information contained in those witness' files). See also Wiehl, supra note 7,
at 75.
11. See Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31.
12. See United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrus,
775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (1984).
13. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). While the issue of discovery of personnel files is not discussed
in the Kyles majority or dissenting opinions, the majority opinion provides a comprehensive
history of the Brady rule, which serves as the foundation for discovery of material
information contained in personnel files of government agents and officers, and includes
profound language about a prosecutor's duty to search out discovery no matter where it
exists, even if controlled by the police. See id. at 434-36.
14. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 90-91.
15. See Wiehl, supra note 7; Howton, infra note 17; Corcoran, supra note 7; Hochman,
infra note 17.
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contained in the personnel files of agents and officers investigating a
case would
be unified in favor of the rule employed in the Ninth
16
Circuit.
While commentators have examined the language in the Kyles
opinion and assessed its impact upon federal discovery practice,17 and
certain federal circuits have refined long standing discovery principles in
light of the Kyles decision,18 the Seventh Circuit has remained fairly
silent in addressing whether Kyles has changed anything relative to the
discovery of material or impeachment material contained in the
personnel files of agents and officers."' Accordingly, the opportunity for
expanding the scope of discovery in federal cases to include the
production of information contained in the files of officers and agents
involved in an investigation may be lost when examining the cases in the
Seventh Circuit since the Kyles decision was released by the Supreme
Court.
Why the fear of loss? While the language in Kyles serves as a
conduit for the expansion of a defendant's rights to compel discovery of
material information contained in the files of agents and officers
involved in a particular case, we practitioners have failed, as of this
writing, to utilize the language contained in the Kyles opinion, coupled
with the Ninth Circuit's well-established procedure for the review and
disclosure of such information, to expand the rule of discovery of
information contained in the personnel files of agents and officers in the
16. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 91-93.
17. See Wiehl, supra note 7; Corcoran, supra note 7; Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning
for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381 (1996); Ty Howton,
Supreme Court Review: Kyles v. Whitley: Death or Declaration?, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1461 (1996); Alicia M. Duff, Comment, Constitutional Law-"Book 'em
Danno"... on Second Thought?... : Supreme Court Clarifies When ProsecutionMust Reveal
Exculpatory Evidence-Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. CL 1555 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249
(1996); Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for the Truth in
CriminalTrials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673 (1996).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Brewer v.
Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 1006 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1997); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d
1350, 1358 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 946 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Van Brocklin, 115 F.3d 587, 595 (8th Cir. 1997); Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d
385, 392-94 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 50 F.3d
801, 834 (10th Cir. 1995); McMillan v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1996).
19. See United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is
no Brady violation when prosecution failed to disclose to the defense material information
controlled by Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Internal Revenue Service because prosecutor did not know about the material evidence and
those agencies were not part of the investigative or prosecution teams).
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Seventh Circuit. There remain, however, several legal bases supporting
an expansion of the discovery rights of a defendant to obtain material
information in the possession of agencies involved in the investigation of
the case. These principles, when applied in conjunction with the
language in the Kyles opinion, provide compelling support for the
erosion of the current standard in the Seventh Circuit in favor of a
broader standard that imposes a duty upon a prosecutor to undertake a
review of the files in the possession of agencies involved in the
investigation of the case to find material information that must be
disclosed to the defendant.
This proposal is not novel. In fact, the existence of applicable rules
in another federal circuit that differ from the Seventh Circuit drives this
article. The Ninth Circuit precedents, which serve as the precursor to
the powerful language utilized by Justice Souter in the Kyles opinion,
justify the proposed broader standard of discovery for criminal
defendants in the Seventh Circuit. Accordingly, the disparity of
standards relating to what a defendant can demand and receive from an
assistant United States attorney found among the federal circuits
provides a compelling reason for the Supreme Court to revisit the
principles set forth in Kyles as applied to the question of whether a
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to inspect the files in the possession
of the agencies investigating the case with the concomitant responsibility
to turn over material information to the defendant? That issue is not
addressed here.
This Article, however, proposes that a broader standard of discovery
of material information contained in agency files be adopted in the
Seventh Circuit. While the argument provided is not exclusive, and at
times illustrative, it is intended to reduce the legal arguments favoring
the broader standard of discovery noted above to print in light of
Seventh Circuit progeny. Thus, the Article is divided into four parts.
Part I briefly describes the core legal rules and principles governing
discovery practice in federal criminal cases. Part II provides an
overview of the conflicting rules in the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Seventh and Ninth circuits respectively concerning the discovery
of information contained in the personnel files of agents and officers. In
the Ninth Circuit, no showing of materiality by the defense is required.
Instead, the government bears the burden of reviewing the files to
ascertain whether there is discoverable information contained in them.
The Seventh Circuit employs a different rule to the same issue. Simply
20. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 103-04.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:547

stated, the Seventh Circuit rule requires that the defendant show that
the information sought from those files is material to the defense. Part
III describes the Kyles v. Whitley decision and how its language is of
great importance to the proposed expanded discovery doctrine
proposed in this article. Part IV sets forth legal bases supporting a
broader discovery rule that imposes a duty upon prosecutors to review
the files in the possession of investigating agencies to find material
information that must be disclosed to defendants. Special attention is
dedicated to the Ninth Circuit approach to the discovery principles
relevant to this discussion.
This subject has been covered recently in the literature by several
commentators. Accordingly, this Article does not attempt to reinvent
the wheel. Instead, this paper pays homage to the literature and relies
upon it to provide the infrastructure for the idea that this article
advocates. This Article concludes that the Seventh Circuit should adopt
the standard that exists in the Ninth Circuit concerning the discovery of
information contained in the personnel files of agents and officers
investigating a particular case. Significantly, the Article provides legal
bases justifying the adoption of the Ninth Circuit rule governing the
issue of discovery of agents' and officers' personnel files in the Seventh
Circuit. Thus, this piece differs from the comprehensive treatment of
the global subject of discovery of material information in such files that
is found in the literature by focusing on first principles. This inquiry
examines the legal bases favoring the Ninth Circuit rule over the present
rule governing such discovery requests in the Seventh Circuit.

21. Professor Wiehl's article, supra note 7, highlights the importance of the Kyles case
and provides a comprehensive treatment of the history, development and modem application
of the law governing the discovery of personnel files of agents and officers investigating a
case. Moreover, Professor Wiehl provides various procedures for efficiently administering
the review and disclosure of impeachment material contained in agents' files in federal
criminal cases. Id. As noted in the accompanying text, this article differs from Professor
Wiehls article in that it provides the legal bases for the adoption of the Ninth Circuit's
discovery rule in the Seventh Circuit. Accordingly, this article focuses on the inquiry: What
legal bases justify the adoption of the Ninth Circuit approach in the Seventh Circuit?
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I. ONCE OVER LIGHTLY: DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASESe

A. The ConstitutionalFramework of Discovery in FederalCriminal
Cases

Defendants in federal criminal cases enjoy no constitutional right to
discovery.? However, federal courts have established rules that require
disclosure to defendants in criminal proceedings of certain types of
evidence so as to protect a defendant's right to due process under law.
Principally, in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that due
process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to
the defendant upon request when that evidence is material to guilt or
punishment.24 After Brady was decided, federal appellate courts
22. Several sources exist regarding the historical development, strategic bases, and rules
governing discovery in federal criminal matters. The source with the most basic utility is the
annual update published by the Georgetown Law Journal. See CriminalProcedureProject,87
GEO. L.J. 1095, 1382-1414 (1999). In fact, this article utilizes the classification of
constitutionally based and statutorily based discovery rules in the accompanying text. There
are seminal criminal procedure treatises and law review articles that provide a comprehensive
treatment of discovery in criminal cases. Examples include: WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 (4th ed. 1992); 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1996); Jonathon M. Fredman,
Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 331 (1998); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure,67 MICH. L.
REV. 249 (1968); Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?
Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1089 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996); Steven Washawsky & Gregory D.
Bassuk, Discovery, 84 GEO. L. 992 (1996); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking
FourthAmendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 257 (1984).
23. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977).
24. 373 U.S. 83. In Brady, the government failed to disclose a confession obtained from
one of the defendant's accomplices after the defendant requested that the prosecution
produce all statements made by co-defendants. Brady was granted a new trial because the
disclosure was material on the question of punishment. See id.at 87-88. Interestingly, the
Supreme Court held that a new trial was not justified because the concealed confession could
not have been used to reduce the offense charged. See id.Significantly, the Brady decision
represents an historical shift in the traditional context in which criminal cases were litigated.
By virtue of requiring disclosure of evidence that was material to the issue of guilt or
sentencing, the Supreme Court signaled its support of a criminal justice system designed to
facilitate finding the truth by ensuring fair rules rather than a traditional adversarial system.
See Hochman, supra note 17. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L. Q.1, 18 (1990);
Barbara Allen Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorableto an Accused and Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1982). While the Supreme Court has not
specifically declared that seeking the truth is the paramount goal of criminal procedure, four
years after Brady was decided, Justice Fortas explained in Giles v. Maryland, "The State's
obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges." 386 U.S. 66, 98
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interpreted the constitutional discovery rule to mean that defendants in
criminal cases were not entitled to discovery before the trial.
Significantly, Brady violations are examined after the trial in postconviction proceedings.' Brady and its progeny have established that
the prosecutor's duty is to disclose material evidence whether or not the
defendant makes a demand for such evidence." The rule in Brady is not
without limits.V A defendant must show that: the evidence was
(1967). But see Giles, 386 U.S. at 117 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (arguing that there has been no
change in the criminal procedure by adopting a rule requiring disclosure of evidence to the
defense when the evidence is material to guilt or sentencing).
25. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 79 n.13 (citing United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107 (6th
Cir. 1971); United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Manhattan
Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
26. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-11 (1976) (stating that a prosecutor's
duty to disclose favorable evidence is governed by the materiality standard and not limited to
situations where a defendant has requested the favorable evidence). For a discussion of
materiality in this context see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1.6, at 37 (1984); Babcock, supra note 24; Brennan, supra note 24; Daniel J.
Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial
Discretionand Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM-L. REV. 391 (1984); Hochman, supra note
17; Richard J. Oparil, Making the Defendant's Case: How Much Assistance Must the
Prosecutor Provide?, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 447 (1986); Emily D. Quinn, Standards of
Materiality Governing the ProsecutorialDuty to Disclose Evidence to the Defense, 6 ALASKA
L. REV. 147 (1989); Steven Alan Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, U. PA. L. REv. 1365 (1987); Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against
Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Victor Bass,
Comment, Brady v. Marylandand the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112
(1972); Sarah M. Bernstein, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Police Failure to Preserve
Evidence and Erosion of the Due Process Right to a Fair Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1256 (1990); Corcoran, supra note 7, at 832-36; Michael T. Fisher, Note,
Harmless Error,ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process
than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1988); Terrence J. GaUigan, Comment, The
Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence after United States v. Bagley, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 213 (1987); Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor'sConstitutional Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735 (1995); Nicholas A. Lambros, Note,
Conviction and Imprisonment Despite Nondisclosureof Evidence Favorableto the Accused by
the Prosecution: Standard of Materiality Reconsidered, 19 NEW ENG. J.ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 103 (1993); Willis C. Moore, Note, Arizona v. Youngblood: Does the Criminal
Defendant Lose His Right to Due Process When the State Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, 5
TOURO L. REV. 309 (1989).
27. For instance, the government has no constitutional duty to disclose the identity of
informants. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The prosecution does have an
affirmative duty, however, to turn over information obtained from an informant that do not
reveal the informant's identity. See id. at 60. The Roviaro court provided an exception to the
rule of nondisclosure of the identity of an informant in the case where revelation is "relevant
and helpful" to the defendant or "essential" to the outcome of the proceeding. Id.
at 60-61.
Thus, the government must disclose the identity of an informant who is a material witness or
whose testimony is substantially relevant to the defense. See id. at 64-65. Depending on the
federal district, close calls can be or must be decided by the trial court in camera. Compare
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purposefully or inadvertently suppressed; the evidence is favorable to
the defendant; and, the evidence is material to the issue of guilt or
punishment.' Defendants who argue that their due process rights have
been violated typically claim that the prosecutor failed to disclose
material evidence in his or her possession, or the prosecutor failed to
gather, or solicit from others, evidence that is potentially material to the
defense. "
Of the two claims, the case law discussing the duty of the prosecutor
to search for potentially material information not in his possession is, at
best, in conflict with and, at worst, negligent regarding the Supreme
Court pronouncements concerning disclosure of material evidence that
is favorable to the defenseO
The prosecutor's duty to turn over favorable evidence under the
Brady doctrine covers not only what has historically been classified as
exculpatory evidence, but also information that the defendant could use
to impeach government witnesses." For example, if the prosecution
United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1072-75 (2d Cir. 1988) (requiring in camera with informant with
defendant's counsel present notwithstanding safety risk to informant when information
potentially material to defense), with United States v. Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 588-89 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stating that trial court may conduct in camera review of information or material
prosecutor failed to include in affidavit to protect informant's safety to determine if
nondisclosure would protect the informant's safety).
28. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,794-95 (1972).
29. See Hochman, supra note 17 at 1676 (categorizing Brady claims as either "Classic
Brady" or "Search Brady" claims). These classifications are derived from case law. See
United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between
exculpatory evidence and sources to obtain exculpatory evidence).
30. See, eg., United States v. Escobar, 842 F. Supp. 1519, 1530 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating
that "the prosecutor is not responsible for knowing what is in the files of other agencies");
United States v. Anderson, 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that
prosecutor has duty to discover exculpatory evidence not in his possession).
31. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). In Giglio, the defendant was
convicted of transferring forged money orders. After the trial, Giglio discovered evidence
that the government had failed to inform him that a co-conspirator had been promised
leniency by the prosecutor who handled the grand jury proceedings. The co-conspirator was
granted immunity and was the only witness to the crime. See id. at 150-51. The prosecutor
who tried the case, however, did not know of the grant of immunity by the government.
Accordingly, the prosecutor did not tell the defendant before trial about the agreement. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that because the government's case depended
in substantial part upon the co-conspirator's testimony, the jury should have learned about
the promise of immunity in assessing the co-conspirator's credibility. Id. at 154-55. A close
reading of the case suggests that the Court's analysis is result-driven because there is little
analysis, other than references to agency law, that the prosecutor should have disclosed a fact
of which he had no knowledge. See Hochman, supra note 17, at 1677 (analyzing Giglio, 405
U.S. at 152-55). See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985) (stating
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within ambit of Brady disclosure
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agrees to compensate a cooperating witness or make a favorable
sentencing recommendation for a cooperating criminal defendant, then
the government is obligated to disclose the details of any agreement to
the defense because such details provide impeachment evidence.#
There is no requirement, however, that federal prosecutors disclose
irrelevant, inculpatory, or independently accessible evidence.' The
government is not required to turn over evidence that the prosecutor
could not reasonably expect to have knowledge of or access to.m
Accordingly, failure to disclose requested evidence that is favorable to
the defendant violates due process where the evidence is material to the
determination of guilt or sentencing.35 Moreover, the prosecution has a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence to the defense known to other
government agents including the police, even when the prosecutor does
not actually possess Brady material. 6 Failure to disclose material
evidence violates principles of due process which are the touchstone of
procedural fairness embedded in the criminal justice system. 7
As noted supra, the general constitutional rule requires the
government to disclose evidence material to the defendant's guilt or
potential sentence. In the post-Brady line of cases, materiality is the
touchstone from which many discovery issues have been evaluated in
federal criminal cases. Accordingly, the Supreme Court established the
requirement).
32. See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
33. See United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1170 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding no Brady
violation in prosecution's failure to disclose information held by the Office of Thrift
Supervision, SEC or IRS because the defendants were aware of the investigation by those
agencies and could have sought the Brady information directly from those agencies).
34. See United States v. Rodriguez-Andrade, 62 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that there was no Brady violation when prosecutor failed to turn over to the defendant an
internal police report from informant's employer because prosecutor had no knowledge that
the report existed).
35. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
36. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). In Kyles, the Supreme Court
expanded the holding of Giglio to extend beyond the prosecutor's office. Id. at 434-41. The
court held that the prosecutor is responsible for producing favorable evidence to the defense
even when the police have not notified the prosecutor of the existence of material evidence.
See id. Justice Souter wrote: "Any argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what
he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the
prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's
obligation to ensure fair trials." Id. at 438. A fair reading suggests that Kyles imposes a duty
upon the prosecutor to learn of favorable evidence not in his file.
37. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-90; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976); United
States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986).
38. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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constitutional standard of material evidence in United States v. Bagley. 9
Evidence is material if it can be said that it would reasonably change the

outcome of the case.40
Deciding how much is enough turns on showing more than a mere
possibility that the undisclosed evidence would change the outcome of41
value.
the trial or might have helped the defense for its impeachment
Satisfying the materiality standard, however, does not require that the

disclosure of the suppressed evidence would result in acquittal if known
to the jury or the court. 2 Viewed in that context, the Supreme Court
has explained that to show the suppressed evidence "could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine

confidence in the verdict."43
A concomitant duty of preservation of evidence exists when the
evidence is likely to be a substantial part of the defendant's defense. In
Californiav. Trombetta,4 the defendants argued that the breath samples
collected by the police should be preserved to impeach the results of the
Intoxilyzer test administered by the police.45 The Supreme Court found
39. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
40. See id. at 682. Bagley filed a pretrial motion seeking discovery concerning
information about the government's witnesses at trial. See id.at 669-70. The prosecutor
failed to disclose the arrangements with the government's cooperating witnesses including
information that the government agreed to pay two principal witnesses in exchange for their
testimony against the defendant. See id. at 671. The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking a new trial. The defendant argued that by failing to disclose the
existence and terms of the cooperation agreement between the government and the principal
witnesses, the prosecution violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland. See id. at
671-77. The federal appeals court for the Ninth Circuit reversed Bagley's conviction. See id.
at 676-77. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit adopted a bright line rule holding that nondisclosure
of impeachment evidence violates due process and will result in automatic reversal. See id.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision explaining that the government's
failure to disclose both exculpatory and impeachment evidence is evaluated to determine if
the evidence is material to the defense. See id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded
the case so that the lower court could determine whether the evidence concerning the
agreement, if introduced at trial, would reasonably have produced a different result. See id. at
684.
41. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10.
42. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995).
43. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court viewed evidence showing that undisclosed evidence
of two of the four eyewitnesses testifying at Kyles' trial were unreliable, coupled with scant
physical evidence connecting Kyles to the murder and conflicting descriptions by witnesses of
the assailant, and evidence that the state's law enforcement witness was less than candid
about the veracity of the evidence against Kyles, was sufficient grounds to find that there
could be no reasonable confidence in the outcome of the verdict finding Kyles guilty. See id.
at 454.
44. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
at 483.
45. See id.
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that such evidence was of low probative value, but explained that the
prosecution has a duty to preserve evidence that has exculpatory value
that is apparent before its destruction and which is the type of evidence
that the defendant could not obtain by other means.' Even in a case
where the police destroy potentially exculpatory evidence, the
defendant must show that the police acted in bad faith in failing to
preserve the favorable evidence in order to claim that her due process
rights were violated.'
B. The Statutory Frameworkof Discovery in FederalCriminalCases
There are several statutory provisions dictating disclosure of
discovery in federal criminal cases. Federal prosecutors are required by
Rules 12.1, 16, and 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
disclose information, in addition to the constitutional disclosure
requirements discussed supra, upon a defendant's demand. For
instance, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a defendant is entitled to discovery of his own statements made to
the police, proof of his prior criminal record, documents and objects
collected by the police relating to the investigation, scientific testing
results and reports, and prosecution expert information that serves as
the foundation for testimony at trial.4 Moreover, the government must
disclose material evidence that the defendant would deem material to
the preparation of the case, as well as evidence that the prosecutor
intends to introduce at trial as evidence-in-chief. 49 The government is
not required, however, to produce confidential internal documents,
memoranda, and reports prepared by government agents in the

46. See id. at 489. The court identified alternative methods of challenging the Intoxilyzer
test and results. See id. at 490.
47. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). In that case, the government
destroyed semen samples from a rape victim's body and clothing pursuant to the rape kit
protocol administered by medical officials because the laboratory tests found no blood or
conclusive semen evidence on the clothing. The victim's clothing had not been refrigerated,
which is required to obtain scientifically valid findings for the presence and attribution of
semen on clothing. See id. at 53-54. Youngblood argued that the victim mistakenly identified
him as the assailant. Accordingly, the destruction of the laboratory tests eliminated evidence
that Youngblood could have used to argue to the jury that there was no physical evidence
linking him to the rape. See id. at 54-55. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. See id.
at 58. The court held that because there was no evidence showing that the police acted in bad
faith in the destruction of the negative evidence, the defendant failed to establish a violation
of his due process rights. See id.
48. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(E).
49. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
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investigation and evaluation of the case.' Moreover, the government
does not have to produce statements made by government witnesses
except as required by the Jencks Act.51 Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure incorporates the requirements of the Jencks Act
into the rules of procedure, but also expands the dictates of the Jencks
Act to include the government's right of discovery of the pretrial
statements of defense witnesses, as well as the defendant's right to
obtain the pretrial hearing testimony of government witnesses.52
Specifically, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or
copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession,
custody or control of the government, and which are material to
the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for
use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were
obtained from or belong to the defendant. 3
It is important to note that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure covers the discovery of evidence that the
government does not necessarily intend to introduce at trial, but is
nevertheless material evidence for the defense.s
Under Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defense is required to furnish the government with a written statement
concerning whether the defendant intends to offer an alibi defense at
trial.55 If the defense, in turn, files a written statement that it intends to
introduce an alibi defense, the government has a mutual and continuing
obligation to file a written statement listing the witnesses it intends to
50. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
51. See Ud Under the Jencks Act, the prosecutor must disclose a government witness'
pretrial statements after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial as long as the
government is in possession of such statement and the statement relates to the testimony
provided by the witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
52. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2; 26.2(g).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
54. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 76 n.3. Accordingly, a defendant who seeks discovery
under the federal rules has the burden to show that the information sought is material to his
defense. See id. (citing 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACEICE AND PROCEDURE,

254,266-67 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1996)).
55. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
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II. CONFLICTING RULES GOVERNING THE DISCOVERY OF AGENTS'
AND OFFICERS' PERSONNEL FILES
A. Overview
A review of the case law and academic literature reveals that the law
governing the discovery of information contained in the personnel files
of agents and officers is fraught with inconsistencies.,
There are,
however, two rules federal courts have applied. A number of federal
circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, require that a defendant in a
criminal case make an offer of proof that the agent's personnel file will
provide evidence that can materially impeach that agent before the
district court will order the prosecutor to produce the file for an in
camera review for information that should be turned over to the
defense.' The Ninth Circuit, however, has a rule that once a defendant
makes a discovery demand for an agent's personnel file, the government
is obligated to review the agent's file for impeachment material. 9 These
rules are discussed in more detail below.
The competing rules outlined above were derived from the
principles described in Part I of the article supra. The first case to deal
with the discovery of an agent's personnel file, United States v. Deutsch,
held that the defendant was entitled to receive the information when it
was shown that the witness involved, a postal worker, was the
government's key witness, and the defendant made a sufficient record
justifying the need to review the witness' personnel file.Wo Conversely,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Muse, upheld the district court's
decision denying the defendant's discovery motion for the production of
the personnel files of the agents who were expected to testify against the

56. See id. at 12.1(b).
57. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 76-77 (discussing split of authority that exists in the
federal circuits).
58. See id. (citing United States v. Valentine, 100 F.3d 1209 (6th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Meros, 866
F.2d 1304 (11th Cir. 1989)).
59. See id.
60. 475 F.2d 55, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1973). It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit did
not create a rule in the case requiring the defense to make a showing of materiality before
triggering a prosecutor's duty to inspect the personnel file of agents and officers. See Wiehl,
supra note 7, at 80.
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defendant at trial, but reiterated the principle that the prosecutor is
obligated to turn over impeachment material.61 Moreover, certain
federal district courts considered this type of discovery issue and
uniformly denied the defense requests for production of personnel
files."
B. The Ninth CircuitRule
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit decided, in United States v. Cadet, that the
prosecutor must collect and give the personnel records to the district
court for an in camera inspection for impeachment material.' The
prosecutor argued that the defense must make a showing of materiality
before discovering personnel records of testifying agents.' The defense
argued that the materials were discoverable based upon a theory of
The
outrageous government conduct and entrapment defense."
appellate panel reasoned that the duty to review the personnel files for
Brady material needed no court order to be in accord with due process,
but rather once the defendant requested the material, the duty of
inspection was triggered. 66 Accordingly, the Cadet decision provides
that the defendant is not required to show materiality of the personnel
files to require the prosecutor to review the files for Brady material. 7
Seven years after Cadet was decided, the Ninth Circuit held, in
United States v. Henthorn, that when a defendant in a federal criminal
case requests impeachment material from the personnel files from
government agents who will testify at trial, the prosecutor has a duty to
examine those files for evidence that is material to the defense.m
61. 708 F.2d 513, 516-17 (10lh Cir. 1983). The court left open the question of whether
the defendant bears the burden of showing the materiality of the information contained in a
personnel file, and whether the prosecutor has a duty to examine personnel files of agents to
find impeachment material. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 81 n.23.
62. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 81 (citing United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444,501 (D.
Del. 1980); United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874 (D.C. 1977); State v. Butts, 630 S.W.2d 37
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)).
63. 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1467-70.
67. See id. at 1467-68. See also Wiehl, supra note 7, at 83.
68. See United States v. Henthom, 931 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1991). Henthorn was
charged and convicted of conspiracy to import, possess, and distribute cocaine, as well as
aiding racketeering activities of interstate enterprises. He filed a pretrial discovery motion
requesting Brady material housed in the personnel files of agents who would testify at his
trial. The prosecutor responded to the motion by arguing that he had no duty to examine
those files because Henthorn had not shown how any information contained in the personnel
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Accordingly, the Henthorn court held that the defendant does not have
to make a showing of materiality to force the prosecutor to examine
personnel files for Brady material. Once the defendant requests such
information, the prosecutor must examine testifying agents' personnel
files for Brady material. 9 The Ninth Circuit panel in Henthorn
determined that the government's position that the defendant had to
make a prior showing of materiality before being entitled to receive
information that was clearly material and have material that was
questionable reviewed in camera was incorrect in light of the court's
precedent in Cadet." Moreover, the court reasoned that the prosecutor
would not be able to satisfy its obligation of turning over Brady material
if she did not review sources of information like personnel files."
Following the decision in Henthorn, prosecutors and district courts
within the Ninth Circuit struggled with the issue of which government
official was responsible for reviewing testifying agents' personnel files."
While the opinions in both Cadet and Henthorn may imply that it was
the prosecutor's responsibility to examine the personnel files of
testifying government agents, those cases did not decide the issue
directly. Moreover, privacy considerations regarding personnel files
created real and complex logistical problems in agency-to-agency
disclosure of such files. 73
Accordingly, prosecutors experienced
substantial problems in satisfying their duty under Cadet and Henthorn,
while navigating the problems associated with obtaining and reviewing
privileged files from agencies outside of the United States attorney's
office.74
The Ninth Circuit began its efforts to address this issue in United
files was material to his defense. The trial court agreed with the government's position and
concluded, in denying Henthorn's discovery motion, that the defendant failed to identify
"specific wrongdoing" that would entitle him to have the prosecutor obtain information from
the personnel files and have that information reviewed in camera by the court. See id. at 2930. See also Wiehl, supra note 7, at 85-86. After conviction at his jury trial, Henthorn filed a
pro se appeal to the Ninth Circuit. He included no precedent supporting his claim that he was
entitled to discovery of testifying agents' personnel files. Instead, the government's response
brief included the citation to the Cadet case, which was utilized by the majority in Henthorn to
make its bright line pronouncement that the defendant's request is enough to trigger the
prosecutor's duty to examine the personnel files of testifying agents and officers for Brady
material. See id. at 86-87.
69. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 85 (citing Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31).
70. See Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31.
71. See id.
72. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 90.
73. See id. at 87-89.
74. See id. at 87-89.
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States v. Dominguez-Villa." In that case, the trial court ordered that it
would exclude the testimony of government agents at trial unless the
agents' respective agency counsel and department heads reviewed their
personnel files for impeachment material.76 The government appealed
the district court's decision. In reversing the decision of the trial court,
the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had exceeded its authority
when it mandated that agency counsel and department heads review the
personnel files of testifying agents because the district court does not
have supervisory powers over the executive branch of the federal
government, and therefore could not order that certain executive branch
officials conduct the reviews.'
The year after the Dominguez-Villa case was decided, the Ninth
Circuit released its opinion in United States v. Jennings, in which the
court reversed the trial court's order that the prosecutor personally
review the personnel files of investigating agents for impeachment
material.78 The Jennings court ruled that the trial court exceeded its
authority when it ordered that the prosecutor personally review
personnel files, but reaffirmed the precedent established in Henthorn
dictating that prosecutors are responsible for learning of Brady
material" Accordingly, the panel tailored its opinion to take account of
the holding in Dominguez-Villa that the trial court lacked authority to
direct the manner in which the prosecutor fulfilled her duty to learn of
Brady material contained in the personnel files of investigating agents,
while maintaining the standard that the prosecutor remained
responsible for learning of impeachment material.'
While Henthorn and its progeny established that federal prosecutors
have a duty to learn of impeachment material and either turn the
information over to the defense or have the trial court examine close
calls in camera, the sagacity of these opinions is limited because
nowhere in these rulings did the Ninth Circuit explain who was to
review personnel files of investigating agents for purposes of locating
Brady material.8'
That question remained when the United States Supreme Court

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

954 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id.
See iU at 565.
United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992).
See i at 1491-92.
See id.
See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 93.
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decided Kyles v. Whitley.' As discussed more fully infra, the Supreme
Court ruled that the prosecutor has a non-delegable duty to learn of
impeachment material even if that information is in the possession of
the police.' While Kyles did not deal with the issue of the discovery of
information contained in the personnel files of testifying agents, the
Kyles opinion perhaps expanded the prosecutor's Brady responsibilities.
Based upon the strength of the Kyles opinion regarding a prosecutor's
non-delegable duty to learn of impeachment material even if he is not in
possession of files or other material that may reveal Brady material, a
federal district court judge in the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v.
Lacy that Jennings was overruled to the extent that a prosecutor could
delegate the review of personnel files to the applicable federal agency.'
The district court dismissed the indictment against one of the
defendants named in the Lacy case and the government appealed to the
Ninth Circuit when the prosecutor failed to comply with the district
court's order that the prosecutor personally review the personnel files of
testifying agents.'
The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
decision in United States v. Herring. The Herring court ruled that the
import of Kyles was limited to the review of personnel files because it
was decided based upon a post-conviction review of a case.' Moreover,
the panel found that Kyles provided no guidance to decide whether a
trial court may order a prosecutor to review personnel fies of testifying
agents.8
On the heels of the Herring decision, the Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Alvarez, affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion for production of the notes of the responding and investigating
officers and agents after a police department investigator reviewed the
notes and found no discrepancies." While the court affirmed the trial
court's decision denying the defendant's discovery request, the Ninth
Circuit voiced its concern that the prosecutor had delegated the review

82 514 U.S. 419 (1995). This opinion and its meaning is discussed at length infra in Part
III.
83. See id. at 439.
84. 896 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
85. See Wiehl, supra note 7, at 92 (citing Transcript of Proceedings at 15, United States v.
Herring (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. CR-94-0384-MHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 265,
United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996)).
86. 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996).
87. See id. at 1121. See also Wiehl, supra note 7, at 93-94.
8& See Herring,83 F.3d at 1122.
89. See United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 903-04 (9' Cir. 1996).
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of the rough notes for impeachment material to a police official.'
In sum, federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit have a rule that
when the defendant makes a request for pretrial discovery of the
personnel file of the testifying government agents, "the government
must examine the file for material that could be used to impeach the
agents' credibility."' Notwithstanding the pronouncement in Kyles that
the prosecutor's duty to learn of favorable evidence for the accused is
non-delegable, the Ninth Circuit does not impose upon the prosecutor
the duty of personally reviewing the personnel files of testifying agents.'
Instead, the agencies employing the testifying agents may review the
respective personnel files to glean whether Brady material is contained
in the files.' If that review reveals impeachment information, then it
must be turned over to the prosecutor for review and is discoverable
with the exception that close calls may be submitted to the trial court for
review in camera.94 Who must conduct the review of personnel files
remains an open question.
C. The Seventh CircuitRule:... For Now?

As is the case in most other circuits, the Seventh Circuit requires
that a defendant must show that an investigating agent's personnel file
contains information that will enable the defendant to materially
impeach the government agent at trial during cross-examination before
the government will be required to review the file for discoverable
information.'
In United States v. Andrus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's order denying the defendant's motion for discovery of all
personnel files of investigating agents who would testify at the trial. The
court decided the issue based upon the defendant's failure to show how
90. See id, at 905.

The court noted that "[d]elegating the responsibility to a

nonattorney ... investigator... to determine whether they contain Brady, Bagley, and Giglio

information is clearly problematic." Id. The court further noted that there is "little
justification and much danger to both the prosecutor's reputation and the quality of justice
her office serves for a prosecutor not to personally review those materials directly related to
the investigation .

..

"Id.

91. Wiehl, supra note 7, at 102 (citing United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir.

1991)).
92. See id. (citing Herring, 83 F.3d at 1122 n.3; United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488,

1491 (9th Cir. 1992)).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Navarro,
737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the files or any information contained in the files were material to the
defense.' 6 The Seventh Circuit, relying upon United States v. Navarro,7
stated that "[m]ere speculation that a government file may contain
Brady material is not sufficient to require remand for in camera
inspection, much less reversal for a new trial. A due process standard
which is satisfied by mere speculation would convert Brady into a
discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the district court." 9
Recently, however, the Seventh Circuit may have expressed interest
in refining its rule governing the discovery of impeachment material
contained in the personnel files of agents involved in the investigation of
a case. In United States v. Morris, the Seventh Circuit examined, among
other things, whether the defendants' rights under Brady were violated
because the government suppressed material information in the
possession of federal agencies that were not part of the investigative
team, but nevertheless possessed information that the defendant argued
was material and exculpatory.99
The facts of the case reveal that the defendants were charged with
mail and wire fraud based upon their actions as officers of Germania
Bank, which is a savings and loan association based in St. Louis,
Missouri.'0 The charges were filed based upon the defendants', Edward
L. Morris, Germania's former Chief Executive Officer, and Steven M.
Gardner, Germania's former Chief Operating Officer, participation in
Germania's ten million dollar offering of subordinated capital notes
("Schnotes"). In making the Schnotes available for sale, Germania
represented in its offering circular that current loan-loss reserves were
"adequate. "'0'
The reserves were not adequate. The Executive Committee of
Germania's Board of Directors had recommended that the savings and
loan approve an additional $9.3 million in loan loss reserves that was
recommended by the bank's management team to cover the potential
96. See Andrus, 775 F.2d at 843. Andrus was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine. He sought the file of the undercover agent who posed as a potential buyer of
cocaine in the case. See iL
97. See Navarro,737 F.2d at 625. In this case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that speculation
that an agent's file may contain impeachment material was not, without more, enough to
trigger the duty of the government to review the file for Brady material or for production to
the court for in camera inspection. The defendant had requested the immigration files from
the I.N.S. relating to a government informant who testified at the defendant's trial. See id.
98. Id. at 631.
99. United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1996).

100. See id. at 1154.
101. Id. at 1155.
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loss on loans made in 1986 and 1987 in larger multi-family residential
and commercial properties."
Rather than heed the advice of its
designated committee, the Board of Directors did not approve the
recommended additional loan-loss reserves because Germania was
about to offer for sale the Schnotes and its controlling shareholder
insisted that the bank show a profit in the quarter ending prior to the
note sale.m Because the additional loan-loss reserves would have
resulted in a loss for the quarter prior to the ten million dollar Schnote
offering, the Executive Committee of the Board authorized loan-loss
reserves necessary to cover known losses in the real estate portfolio." 4
Germania then sold the Schnotes. ' °5
Shortly after the Schnote offering, Germania's auditors
recommended that loan-loss reserves be elevated to the level at about
what was recommended before the Schontes were sold.' °6 Accordingly,
Germania eventually took a loan-loss reserve of an additional $9.4
million in February 1988 which was near the completion of the Schnote
offering.'" The bank's financial condition deteriorated into the spring
and it was placed into conservatorship by the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) in June 1990." s The Schnotes were worthless."°
The investors recouped nothing on their investment.1
The government alleged that the misrepresentation in the bank's
Schnote offering circular about the bank's actual financial condition was
intended to mask from investors the bank's actual financial condition,
resulting in investors being induced to buy the Schnotes based upon
bogus information, through the use of the wires and mail."' In
prosecuting its case, the government relied primarily upon one of
Germania's former loan officers, who testified, with the use of a large
number of documents, that there was a disparity between the offering
circular representations and the bank's actual financial situation."'
102. See id An audit had revealed the loan portfolio's problems and the failure to set
aside adequate loan-loss reserves on the expanded real estate portfolio from 1985-1986. See
id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See iU.at 1154-55.
112. See id.
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As part of the bank's reporting requirements as well as inquiries
from the SEC, the IRS, and the RTC, a large volume of records were
retained by those agencies during the pendency of the criminal case
against Morris and Gardner."' Citing Brady and Kyles, the defendants
argued, both in post-conviction and appellate proceedings, that the
government failed to learn of exculpatory information
114 contained in the
records retained by the SEC, the IRS, and the RTC.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' argument. The court
found that the defendants had failed to make a Brady request prior to
trial and could have obtained the records themselves prior to trial
because the prosecutor had made such records available for review."5
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the agencies involved were not
part of the prosecution team and, therefore, the prosecutor had no duty
to learn of impeachment material from agencies that6 conducted
independent investigations not related to the criminal case."
Significantly, in justifying its decision that the prosecutor had no
duty to review files retained by agencies that were not part of the
investigation team, the court made several pronouncements suggesting
that the files retained by agencies that are part of the investigation team
must be reviewed by the prosecutor to fulfill her duty under Brady. For
example, the court noted its general rule that the government's duty to
disclose exculpatory or impeachment material is limited to information
known by the government."7 The court then stated, "Although we have
not interpreted Brady as requiring prosecutors to affirmatively seek out
information not presently in their possession, we have found it improper
for a prosecutor's office to remain ignorant about certain aspects of a
case or to compartmentalize information so that only investigating
8
officers, and not the prosecutors themselves, would be aware of it.""1
The court also noted that the Seventh Circuit has long followed the
rule announced in Kyles that Brady is violated "even where police,
rather than prosecutors, are responsible for the suppression of
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1168-69.
115. See id. at 1168-70.
116. See id. at 1169-70.
117. See id. (citing United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir.); United States v.
Young, 20 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir.
1985).
118. Morris, 80 F.3d at 1169 (citing Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 877-78 (7th Cir.
1984); Young, 20 F.3d at 764). See Moore, 25 F.3d at 569; United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d
889, 898 (7th Cir. 1990).

2000] AGENT PERSONNEL FILES AND FEDERAL DISCOVERY

571

exculpatory information."119 The court clarified, however, that "neither
Kyles nor Fairmancan be read as imposing a duty on the prosecutor's
office to learn of information possessed by other government agencies
that have no involvement in the investigation or prosecution at issue.""'
The Seventh Circuit appears to suggest in the quoted passage in Morris
that information in the possession of the prosecution team must be
examined by the prosecutor to determine whether Brady exists. Lastly,
the Morris court ruled that no Brady violation exists when the
information was available to the defendant "through the exercise of
reasonable diligence.""
D. The Implications

The two basic rules governing the same discovery issue outlined
above have prompted the call for Supreme Court review so that the
forum disparity that results from the application of the two rules will be
eliminated.' " This anomaly poses significant problems for prosecutors
and criminal defense attorneys alike. While there is a uniform set of
rules designed to ensure that the defense is entitled to discovery of
material information once the prosecutor learns that the evidence exists,
the duty to look for such information may depend upon where the case
is being prosecuted.Y This means that a prosecutor in a district within
the Ninth Circuit will more readily find impeachment material in the
personnel files of agents investigating the case because of the duty to
learn of impeachment material upon a discovery request, whereas a
prosecutor in a federal district outside of the Ninth Circuit may not
learn of such information because no duty exists unless the defense
convinces the court that material information exists in a particular
agent's file. Professor Wiehl points out that the practical difference
between the two rules results in prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit seeking
an alternative agent to use at trial when she learns that an agent's
personnel file contains impeachment material, or making a more
generous plea offer than would have otherwise been made but for the
impeachment information contained in the agent's file. 2

119. Morris,80 F.3d at 1169 (citing Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386,391 (7th Cir. 1985)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1170.
122. See Wiehl, supranote 7, at 121-27.
123. See id. This point is illustrated in the cited article by way of interviews of federal
prosecutors and defense attorneys.
124. See id. at 77.
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The anomaly highlights the regional differences and diminution of
transparency that exists when two contrary rules govern the
administration of identical discovery requests regarding the discovery of
the personnel files of agents and officers involved in a particular case,
resulting in a split of authority with no guidance, as of this writing, from
the Supreme Court, other than a strong pronouncement in dicta in the
Kyles case.

The Seventh Circuit has not ruled directly on this issue since Kyles
was decided. Rather, while other circuits have considered and decided
the issue, the Seventh Circuit has decided the issue on the margins.
Although the Seventh Circuit's basic rule that a defendant must make a
prior showing of materiality before the district court will entertain an in
camera review of personnel files remains intact, there is language found
in United States v. Morris2' that when coupled with the language found
in Kyles, providing that a prosecutor's duty to learn of favorable
evidence for the accused is non-delegable, suggests that the Seventh
Circuit may be amenable to adopting the present rule in the Ninth
Circuit. This position is advocated infra in Part IV.
Much has been made up to this point about the importance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Kyles v. Whitley.'2 Before the argument is
made suggesting that recent Seventh Circuit precedent coupled with
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law provides compelling evidence that
the Seventh Circuit should adopt the rule established in the Ninth
Circuit governing the discovery of personnel files of testifying agents, a
discussion of the Kyles case is appropriate to complete the outline of
discovery principles provided supra. That discussion is provided in the
next part.
III. KYLES V. WHITLEY: A BRIEF SUMMARY

This case took place in New Orleans. A sixty-year-old woman,
Dolores Dye, was murdered in the middle of the afternoon on
September 20, 1984, as she was putting her groceries in the trunk of her
car in the parking lot of Schwegmann Brother's grocery store. The man
who killed her, approached her, demanded her car, and when Delores
Dye refused, had pulled a gun. A struggle ensued and the man shot
Delores Dye in her left temple. The gunman took her keys and drove

125. 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that it is improper for a prosecutor to
remain ignorant about certain material of a case).
126. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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off in her red LTD.V1
The New Orleans police obtained seven eyewitness statements from
two people who were waiting for a bus, three witnesses who were
employed by Schwegmann Brother's and were in the parking lot when
the murder occurred, and two additional witnesses to the murder who
left the area after the murder but called the police and reported what
they saw." The witnesses offered varying descriptions of the gunman,
but were united in their accounts of these events that the assailant was
black."z For instance, four witnesses agreed that the gunman had
braided hair 1 O Notwithstanding the almost unanimous belief that the
gunman had braided hair, one witness told the police that the assailant
had short hair, while another witness said the man had shoulder length
hair." Two witnesses agreed that the assailant was between seventeen
and eighteen years old, while another witness claimed that the gunman
could have been as old as twenty-eight." Moreover, one witness
believed that the man was 5'4" or 5'5" and weighed between 140 and
150 pounds, while another witness described the gunman as six feet tall
with a slim build.' Still another witness claimed that the assailant had a
mustache. None of the other five witnesses claimed that the man had
a mustache. 35
While the police showed up at the scene shortly after the murder
occurred at approximately 2:20 p.m., the police did not record the
license plate numbers of the cars in the Schwegmann Brother's parking
lot until 9:15 p.m. that evening." The police believed that the assailant
drove his car to the grocery store parking lot and fled in Delores Dye's
car."3 What may have been a solid investigative instinct was acted upon
too late. A check of the license plate numbers of the vehicles in the
parking lot recorded by the New Orleans police, coupled with a check of
individuals matching the descriptions provided by the eyewitnesses,
M

127. See id. at 423. For a comprehensive explanation of the Kyles case see Howton,
supra note 17 and Corcoran, supra note 7.
128. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 423 n.2.
129. See id. at 423.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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produced no leads to track down Mrs. Dye's killer.'"
Without any productive leads, the police failed to advance the
investigation until a man calling himself James Joseph contacted the
New Orleans police on September 22.3 Joseph told the police that on
the day of the homicide he had purchased a red Thunderbird from a
friend named Curtis.'1° When Joseph read about Dye's murder in the
newspaper, he feared being linked to the murder by virtue of purchasing
14
1
a car from Curtis, whom he later identified as Curtis Kyles.
Accordingly, the police insisted that Joseph come to the police station to
meet with the police investigators handling the homicide investigation."
The caller met with the police hours later. 3 As it turned out, Joseph
was not his last name. The police learned that the man, universally
referred to in the reported opinions from the state court of appeals
through the supreme court as "Beanie," had several aliases. His real
name was Joseph Wallace, but he went by the name "Beanie." ' 44 In the
interest of continuity, I reference Joseph Wallace as Beanie herein as
well.
Beanie's story changed almost as frequently as his name did. When
Beanie met with the police, he changed his original account of how he
came in contact with the red Ford Thunderbird. He originally told the
police that he bought the car from Curtis Kyles on Thursday, but later
told the investigative officer that he did not see Kyles on Thursday, but
bought the car from Kyles on Friday.45 Beanie told the police that he
lived with Kyles' brother, and described Kyles as six-feet tall, twentyfour to twenty-five years old, and slim.'4o Moreover, Beanie said that
Kyles had a "bush" hairstyle, but had been known to wear his hair in
braids. "7 He admitted, however, that ,NhenKyles sold him the red Ford,
Kyles' hair was in a "bush" hairstyle.'4
Further, Beanie told the
investigating officer that Kyles carried two guns with him, made a living

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 423-24.
See id. at 424.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 425.
See id.
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robbing people, and had even tried to kill Beanie in the past.149
Beanie told the officers that after he bought the red car, he and

Kyles' brother drove Kyles to the Schwegmann's parking lot at about
9:00 p.m. on Friday evening to pick up Kyles' car that he described as an
orange four-door Ford.'-' He took the police to where he recalled Kyles'
car being parked in the Schwegmann's parking lot. 5' Beanie claimed
that Kyles retrieved a purse from nearby bushes which Kyles hid in his
apartment.'
Moreover, Beanie recalled that there were groceries in
Schwegmann's bags and a potty seat in the back seat of the red Ford."
Beanie took the investigators to the place where he kept the car. The
car was later determined to be Dye's red Ford LTD." Moreover,
Beanie suggested that he could set Kyles up so that the police could
retrieve the gun used to kill Dye. 5 Beanie also took the police to the
place where he claimed Kyles lived.56 All the while, Beanie appeared to
be concerned that he would be linked to the murder because he
admitted to the police that he changed the license plates on the red Ford
and had been seen driving the car in the French Quarter of New Orleans
on Friday evening."
After showing the investigators where the red car was located as well
as the detail of the Schwegmann's parking lot, Beanie returned to the
police station with the officers.1 There, he gave a third statement to the
police. 59 This third statement deviated from the two prior statements
Beanie provided to the police. For instance, Beanie said that he actually
helped Kyles unload the groceries from the trunk and back seat of the
red Ford and placed them in Kyles' car just after he bought the car from
Kyles.'" Moreover, Beanie told the police that he saw Kyles retrieve a
brown purse from the red Ford and that they then drove in the separate
cars to Kyles' apartment, where they unloaded the groceries.16

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
See id. The car was actually a two-door Mercury model. See id. at 425 n.5.
See id.
See id. at 426.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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told the police that he went with Kyles and Kyles' brother to
Schwegmann's a few hours later, where they recovered Kyles' car and a
brown purse that was located next to a building.16 Accordingly, this
latter account fails to explain why his group would go to Schwegmann's
to recover the car, groceries, and purse when he had seen Kyles with
those items a few hours earlier.'6
Notwithstanding Beanie's recitation of facts connecting Kyles to the
murder of Delores Dye, the police did not attempt to find Kyles.'6
Rather, Beanie went to Kyles' apartment on that Sunday, September 23,
at around 2:00 p.m., after Beanie had discussed the whereabouts of the
murder weapon with one of the police investigators.'6 Beanie stayed at
Kyles apartment from 2:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m., when he left and
contacted the police.'6 Thereafter, Beanie went back to Kyles'
apartment at 7:00 p.m., and remained there until about 9:30 p.m. 67
Beanie again made contact with the police.6'
The police arrested Kyles on Monday, September 24 at 10:40 a.m.'6
He was arrested outside of his apartment. After his arrest, the police
searched Kyles' apartment and found a .32-caliber revolver behind the
kitchen stove. 7 That revolver had five bullets and one spent casing in
the cylinder." Ballistics testing showed that this revolver was the
weapon used to kill Mrs. Dye.r 3 The police also found several .32caliber rounds of the same brand that was found in the revolver behind
the stove.'
Moreover, the police found Schwegmann's grocery bags
that contained cans of the same brand of cat food that Mrs. Dye
purchased for her cat."5 The police also collected garbage from outside
of Kyles' apartment. In that garbage search, the police recovered Dye's
162. See id. at 426-27.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 427. Beanie made a fourth statement to the police in November 1984.
This statement was actually given between Kyles' first and second murder trials. This fourth
statement provided information about Beanie's activities on Sunday, September 23.
166. See id.

167. See id.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

174. See id.
175. See id.
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purse, identification, and other personal effects, all wrapped in a
Schwegmann's grocery bag."6
These items were tested for fingerprints1 n No prints were found on
the revolver, but several prints were found on the purse and the red
Ford LTD, none of which were Kyles' fingerprints. 78 However, Kyles'

finger prints were lifted from a small piece of paper, a Schwegmann's
sales slip, recovered from the front passenger-side seat of Mrs. Dye's
car.7 Moreover, three of the six eyewitnesses noted supra identified
Kyles as the assailant in a photo-array. Two did not identify Kyles as
the murderer, and the remaining eyewitness did not participate in the
identification process.'O

Kyles was indicted for first-degree intentional homicide. 8 Before
his trial, Kyles' lawyer filed a discovery motion asking for exculpatory
and impeachment evidence." The prosecution responded to Kyles'
discovery motion in the negative stating that there was no exculpatory
evidence of any kind despite the fact that there were conflicting
eyewitness statements, records of Beanie's initial call to the police along
with differing versions of Beanie's oral and written statements to the
police, a taped conversation of Beanie to the police, the police computer
printout of the license plates taken from Schwegmann's parking lot on
the night of the murder that showed that Kyles' car was not listed, the
internal police report calling for the retrieval of garbage from outside of
Kyles' apartment building based upon Beanie's suggestion that Dye's
purse may be there, and evidence linking Beanie to other acts, evidence,
and crimes at Schwegmann's, as well as the murder of Patricia
Leidenheimer, the previous January.1 3
Kyles' trial was held in November 1984 before a jury in Louisiana."8
Not surprisingly, Kyles argued that he was framed by Beanie."

176. See id.
177. See id. at 428
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 428-29.
184. See id. at 429.
185. See id. Kyles suggested that Beanie led the police to him and planted incriminating
evidence in Kyles' apartment. Beanie was motivated to remove Kyles from the community so
that Beanie could pursue the romantic affection of Pinky Bums, who was romantically linked
to Kyles. Kyles also offered an alibi defense that he was with his children. See id.
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Significantly, Beanie did not testify at the trial.' The prosecution relied
upon the eyewitness testimony from four people who were on the scene
when Dye was murdered." The jury deliberated for four hours and
maintained that they were deadlocked."8 Accordingly, the trial court
ordered a mistrial.189
After the trial, the prosecutor interviewed Beanie."9 This interview
revealed still more inconsistencies in Beanie's version of his story. 9' For
instance, Beanie told the prosecutor that he went with Kyles to get
Kyles' car from the Schwegmann's parking lot on Thursday, the day of
the murder, between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.1 9 This is contrasted with
Beanie's earlier accounts where he claimed that he had gone with Kyles
to get the car on Friday at 9:00 p.m.1 93 Moreover, in Beanie's second
statement to the police, he said that he had not seen Kyles on Thursday
at all.' 94
Beanie also said that he was not only accompanied by Johnny Burns
to get Kyles' car, but also that Kevin Black went with him to get the
car.'95 Beanie's claim that Black had gone with him to get Kyles' car was
new. He had not told the police about this fact until after the first trial,
in the interview with the prosecutor. Moreover, Black testified for the
defense at the first trial.'6
Beanie said, for the first time, that after the group retrieved Kyles'
car from Schwegmann's, they went to Black's house, picked up groceries
in Schwegmann's bags, a potty, and a purse, and took the items to Kyles'
apartment."9 Moreover, Beanie now said that he had not been at Kyles'
186. See id.
187. See id. Three of the four witnesses had previously identified Kyles in a photograph
array conducted by the police. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id. Declaring a mistrial after the jury had deliberated for four hours is
somewhat surprising given the fact that this was a murder trial since the remedy for a
deadlocked jury is a mistrial with the substantial likelihood of retrial. Accordingly, declaring
a mistrial after such a short period of deliberations is expensive and contrary to principles of
judicial economy. The record shows that the court inquired of the jury regarding the scope
and intensity of their deliberations, but did not give the jury an instruction that implored the
jury to reconvene and deliberate further.
190. See Kyles. 514 U.S. at 429.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 430.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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apartment twice as previously stated, but that he was there just once."
None of this information was turned over to the defense for the second
trial.' 99
Shortly thereafter in December 1984, Kyles was tried again in
Louisiana.' The prosecution again relied upon the testimony of now
four eyewitnesses who identified Kyles as the murderer."' Moreover,
the State introduced a blown-up photograph of the Schwegmann's
parking lot shortly after the murder occurred that showed a two-toned
car that the prosecutors, without any corroborating evidence, argued
was Kyles' car.2 Beanie did not testify at the second trial.m
The defense argued that the eyewitnesses were mistaken. Kyles
called witnesses, including Kevin Black, who testified that he saw
Beanie, his hair in braids, driving a red car approximately one hour after
Moreover, a second witness testified that
the murder occurred.'
Beanie, his hair in braids, tried to sell him a red car, similar to Dye's car,
on Thursday evening, shortly after the murder. Yet another witness
testified that Beanie, his hair in a Jheri curl, wanted to sell him the car
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. After conviction and pending appeal, Kyles filed a motion under Rule
60(b)(2) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to reopen the judgment of the
federal district court's judgment denying his writ of habeas corpus. That was later affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, claiming that one of the
eyewitnesses has committed perjury in her identification of Kyles as the murderer. See id. at
432 n.6. In an affidavit from the eyewitness, Darlene Kersh (formerly Cahill), who was one of
the witnesses who contacted the police after the murder happened and therefore had not
given a contemporaneous statement on the scene, swore that she told the police and the
prosecutors that she did not see Kyles' face and could not identify him, but that she identified
him untruthfully after being told by either the police or the prosecutors that the murderer
"would be the guy seated at the table with the attorney and that was the one I should identify
as the murderer." Id. Her affidavit also revealed that she agreed to identify Kyles only after
the authorities assured her that all of the evidence pointed to Kyles as the killer. See id. The
federal district court denied Kyles' motion ruling that it was an abuse of the writ, but that
decision was overruled by the Fifth Circuit instructing the district court to deny the motion on
the ground that a petitioner cannot use the writ to raise a Rule 60(b) motion to argue
constitutional claims not included in the writ of habeas corpus. See id. Kyles sought state
collateral review of the ruling. See id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted review and
ordered that the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing. See id. The United States
Supreme Court stayed all action pending its review of the case. See id. Because the Supreme
Court reversed Kyles' conviction, the motion was not decided.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
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Beanie's friend, Johnny Bums, testified that he saw Beanie

stooping down near the stove at Kyles' apartment on Sunday.w The
defense also explained that Kyles kept cat food in his apartment because
he fed stray cats.m The defense introduced evidence that Beanie was
romantically interested in Pinky Bums."
Kyles testified at the trial in his own defense.2 0 He denied

involvement in Dye's murder. 211 He explained that his fingerprints were
found on the store receipt from Schwegmann's recovered from Dye's
car because he rode in a red car that Beanie picked him up in on Friday,
September 24.12 Significantly, Kyles testified that Beanie drove him to
the very Schwegmann's where Dye was killed and bought transmission

fluid and cigarettes. 23 Accordingly, Kyles suggested that the receipt fell
out of the bag that contained his purchases. 4
The prosecutors offered a rebuttal to the defense.

Beanie was

brought into the courtroom and placed next to Kyles.

The State's

eyewitnesses who

testified earlier in the trial reaffirmed

their

identification of Kyles as the murderer.
Kyles was convicted of first-degree homicide by the jury. 216 He was
sentenced to death.2 17 Kyles' efforts to have the judgment of conviction
and sentence overturned on direct appeal in state courts failed. 8
206. See id.
207. See id. at 430-431. Recall that the revolver used to kill Dye was recovered by the
police from behind the kitchen stove at Kyles' apartment. See page 431 of the text supra.
208. See id. at 431.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. It is important to note that when the State crime laboratory conducted
fingerprint analysis on the Schwegmann's store receipt recovered from Dye's car, the testing
process destroyed the print on the paper. See id. at 452.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
21& See State v. Kyles, 513 So. 2d 265 (La. 1987), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988). On
direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined whether the items recovered from the
garbage outside of Kyles' home and the gun seized from Kyles' apartment were improperly
admitted into evidence. The appellate court also considered whether the prosecution
intimidated defense witnesses by asking the court to advise those witnesses of their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and by further advising the court that the State
may charge defense witnesses with being accessories after the fact to the murder was
prejudicial. Moreover, the court examined whether the trial court's order curtailing the
closing statements of the defense was an abuse of discretion. Lastly, the appellate tribunal
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Thereafter, Kyles sought state collateral review of his case which
revealed that State officials had never disclosed evidence favorable to
him.21 9 This evidence consisted of eyewitness statements taken by the

police; an informant's statements who was not called to testify at the
trial; and a computer print-out of the license plate numbers of the cars
parked in the parking lot where the murder occurred in which the
defendant's car was not listed?3 The federal district court denied Kyles'
habeas corpus petition and the federal appellate court affirmed the
district court's decision.?'
Thereafter, Kyles petitioned the United States Supreme Court. The
court granted certiorari.m In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
reversed Kyles's conviction and ordered a new trial*3 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, wrote that the government's obligation to
disclose favorable evidence to the defense is to be balanced by weighing
the effect the evidence will have on the defense with any cumulative
evaluated the prejudicial effect that the prosecutor's comments during the closing statement
may have had upon the jury relative to their evaluation of guilt and punishment. See i& at
267. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decisions of the trial court by finding that
the evidence recovered outside of Kyles' residence was abandoned. Therefore, there was no
expectation of privacy, which is required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, when the police recovered the evidence without a warrant. Further, the
Louisiana court upheld the trial court's decision denying the defendant's motion to suppress
the revolver recovered from the kitchen by finding that the search warrant satisfied the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court determined that
neither the defense witnesses were intimidated to the level of finding that Kyles' rights were
violated, nor did the prosecutor's comments during closing show that Kyles was
constitutionally prejudiced. See i. at 269-77.
219. See!i
220. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 420-21.
221. See id. at 432; see Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1993). Notwithstanding the
litany of evidence presented to the federal appellate court that was not disclosed to Kyles
during his trials, including evidence of further discrepancies in Beanie's version of events and
police reports providing useful evidence that supported Kyles' argument that he did not
commit the murder, and his request that the court not apply the probable effect standard to
the suppressed evidence, the Fifth Circuit examined the probable effect that the evidence
would have had on the jury, and ruled that the prosecution did not suppress exculpatory
evidence, and that the outcome would not have been different had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense. Moreover, the court ruled that there was no prosecutorial
misconduct, nor ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 811-18. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Judge King, in his dissent to the Fifth
Circuit's ruling, wrote "[flor the first time in my fourteen years on this court... I have serious
reservations about whether the State has sentenced to death the right man." Id. at 820.
222. See Kyles v. Whitley, 114 S. Ct. 1610 (1994).
223. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined Justice Souter in the majority opinion. See id. at 421. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. See id.
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effect that the undisclosed evidence will have upon the defendant's
case.224 Moreover, Justice Souter noted that a prosecutor's obligation to
evaluate whether certain evidence is discoverable under a materiality
analysis remains notwithstanding the police's failure to notify the
prosecutor that the evidence exists.'
The Court examined the
suppressed evidence in Kyles' case and determined that the evidence
was material to the defense relative to guilt.226 Thus, the Court ordered
a new trial.'m
In making its finding, the majority opinion reviews the history of a
prosecutor's duty to disclose material information by reviewing the
cases involving the disclosure rule most clearly aligned with Brady' and
its progeny including Mooney v. Holohan 9 and Pyle v. Kansas.'
Quoting from Brady, Justice Souter noted that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."22 ' From this history of early cases, Justice Souter restated
the Brady duty of disclosure and reiterated the continued importance of
the materiality standard derived from United States v. Bagley.' By
emphasizing the importance of the materiality principle, the Kyles Court
reiterated that materiality is defined by determining whether the
evidence has a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence
2 3
would conceivably cast doubt upon the credibility of the conviction.
Accordingly, materiality of evidence is not to be evaluated under a
sufficiency of the evidence standard or proven by a preponderance of
the evidence, but to be examined in conjunction with ali of the evidence
to determine if, in the absence of the evidence, the defendant "received
a fair trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."2M
224. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421,434.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 432 (citingBrady, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
229. See id. (citingMooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
230. See id. (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,215-216 (1942)).
231. Id. at 432 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 79495 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 97 (1976))).
232. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
233. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 685).
234. Id. at 434. Justice Souter structured his analysis by highlighting what he termed
"four aspects of materiality." Id. Justice Souter first defined materiality and reaffirmed that
the materiality standard is evaluated using the "reasonable probability" test. Next, he
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The fourth aspect of the Court's "four aspects of materiality"
analysis provides guidance to prosecutors in assessing whether to
disclose certain evidence under the materiality test. Justice Souter
noted that while the prosecutor has discretion to review and decide what
evidence shall be disclosed to the defense, that same discretion creates a
responsibility to assess the probable effect of evidence and disclose at
the point of "reasonable probability. '' 23 Having this discretion means
that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the

case, including the police."
The Court justified this fourth aspect of materiality by suggesting
that a prosecutor will not be subject to error for not turning over
evidence unless the threshold of materiality is crossed.2 Moreover,
having the prosecutor be responsible for evaluating the quality of
evidence under the materiality test reinforces the institutional interest of
maintaining trust in prosecutors to ensure that justice is done rather
than winning a case, as well as ensuring that the trial is the forum for the
evaluation of the evidence relative to guilt or innocence rather than in
the prosecutor's private evaluation of all of the evidence.'
clarified materiality for what it does not stand for including negating the sufficiency of
evidence and preponderance of evidence approaches applied by the appellate court. Third,
the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach of using a harmless error analysis in processing
the evidence under the materiality standard. Lastly, Justice Souter emphasized that
materiality is to be evaluated collectively with all of the evidence to determine if a Brady
violation occurred. See id.at 434-38.
235. Id. at 437.
236. 1d The Court further explained that successful or not in this endeavor, and
whether in good or bad faith, the prosecutor's responsibility to learn of favorable evidence
that would cast doubt upon the outcome, from whatever its source, is "inescapable." Id. at
437-38.
237. See id. at 439. The Court wrote:
Unless, indeed, the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a
gladiatorial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth,
the government simply cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the
suppression of evidence has come to portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as
to destroy confidence in its result.
This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the
wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence... This is as it should be.
Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure").
238. See id. at 439-40 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900-01 (1984) (recognizing that the goal of the criminal justice system is
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After discussing the materiality standard, the Court reviewed the
record and criticized the appellate court's reliance upon sufficiency of
the evidence, preponderance of the evidence, and harmless error
analysis in evaluating Kyles' claims.29 Moreover, the Court applied the
materiality standard to Kyles' case and found that the suppressed
evidence would have resulted in a different outcome of the trial if
turned over to Kyles.m
In making this determination, the majority found that the police
investigation was limited by its failure to critically assess the evidence
including four versions of the event from Beanie; that one of the
investigating detectives failed to be candid during his testimony at trial;
that the informant's behavior strongly suggested that he planted the
murder weapon and the victim's purse in the places those items were
found by the police; that one of the four eyewitnesses provided a
description that did not match Kyles, but more closely described the
informant; that another eyewitness had been coached since first claiming
that he did not see the killer during the murder, whereas at trial he
claimed to have witnessed the killing, described the weapon used in the
killing, and omitted parts of his first statement that would have
conflicted with his trial testimony; and that there was no unified
descriptions of the murderer. 241

to establish "procedures under which criminal defendants are 'acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.'" (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165,175 (1969)).
239. See id. at 440.
240. See id. at 441-54. Justice Scalia filed a dissent in the case. See id. at 456. He was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. See id The dissenting
opinion focuses primarily on the grounds for granting certiorari in the Kyles case, but does
criticize the majority opinion's application of the probable effect standard to the facts of the
case by arguing that the evidence presented against Kyles consisted of a solid core of facts
justifying the jury's verdict. See id. at 456-74. Moreover, the dissent argues that the
majority's fact-based evaluation that is inclusive of the suppressed evidence is subject to
equally compelling counter-arguments showing that Kyles is guilty of the murder. See id. at
460-74. Accordingly, Justice Scalia utilizes the majority opinion to argue that the Supreme
Court review of capital cases on a substantive basis fails to adhere to its historical role of
reviewing such cases for constitutional error and will result in the dilution of the principle that
suppressed or new evidence be evaluated in the light of the entire record in determining if
such evidence would have the probable effect of a different result. See id. at 458-60. A
critical evaluation of the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in the Kyles case is
found in Howton, supra note 17.
241. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441-54.
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S

RULE PROVIDING FOR DISCOVERY OF MATERIAL INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THE PERSONNEL FILES OF TESTIFYING AGENTS AND
OFFICERS.

Like Justice Souter's emphatic reminder that prosecuting attorneys
cannot stick their head in the sand when confronted with exculpatory or
material evidence that should be disclosed to defendants in criminal
cases, so too must the Seventh Circuit "not stick its head in the sand"
when confronted with a fairly recent development in the area of pretrial
discovery: the issue of whether prosecutors have a duty to review
personnel files of agents and officers investigating criminal cases to
determine if there is discoverable material in those files that must be
turned over to defendants.
So often, federal indictments contain allegations that are the product
of an investigation by federal, state, and local law enforcement agents
and officers. Because federal criminal cases often involve several law
enforcement officers and agents, a byproduct of discovery practice is to
ascertain the credibility of the agents and officers, as much of the
information forming the basis of the allegations contained in
indictments is obtained by way of police surveillance. Challenging the
credibility of agents and officers is a difficult task for the defense. While
I do not presume that law enforcement officials conduct themselves
outside of the law or even beyond the scope of their duties, one likely
source of impeachment material is his or her personnel file. Imposing
the burden upon the defense to identify impeachment information that
is material is inefficient and impractical because that information is in
control of the government. How would a defendant know, using
reasonable means of investigation, that an agent who will testify against
him has been reprimanded within the last year for contaminating
evidence in a homicide case? Do judicial officers and the polity really
believe that making a request under the Freedom of Information Act or
utilizing the services of an investigator will consistently and efficiently
produce impeachment material contained in a prosecution team
member's personnel file in a timely manner? Unless the defendant's
attorney is a seasoned trial counsel who.is familiar with substantially all
of the agents and officers investigating any given case, material
information in an agent's personnel file may pass the defendant by
without the defense ever knowing about the impeachment material. All
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along, however, the government possessed this material.
Simply stated, an efficient and fair means of assuring that the
defendant has access to impeachment material regarding agents and
officers is to require the prosecutor to look in the personnel files. One
method of assessing the credibility of officers and agents is to ask the
district court to undertake a review of the personnel records of law
enforcement agents and officers who participated in the investigation
and ask the court to turn over to the defense those personnel files which
are material to the credibility of the agents and officers. This approach
is justified under the principle that the defense is entitled to request that
the government undertake a review of agency personnel files and
disclose exculpatory and impeachment information contained in the
files. Alternatively, the trial court could conduct an in camera review of
the testifying agents' personnel files to determine whether exculpatory
or impeaching information in those personnel files must be disclosed to
the defense in order to protect the due process rights of the defendants
under Brady v. Maryland242 and its progeny as outlined above. 24 3
A. DefendantsAre Entitled to All Records and InformationRelevant to
the Impeachment of the InvestigatingAgents and Officers
The information sought in an agent's personnel file may be relevant
to impeach the testimony and credibility of agents and officers who will
be witnesses in this case at pretrial hearings and trial, to prove character
traits of the agents and/or officers in question, to establish their bias, to
refresh recollection, and to prove their conduct, custom, propensity, and
habit in conformity with such traits.
As discussed supra and in the accompanying text, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is the touchstone for
the right of a federal criminal defendant to the production of
exculpatory evidence in the possession of the government. In 1963, the
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland made this right a pillar of our
judicial system.2" This includes all evidence pertinent to a witness'
credibility or reliability.245 Thus, the law requires that defendants be
provided with information regarding all prior material acts of

242. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
243. See supra Parts MIL.
244. See Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972);
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
245. See United States v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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misconduct by witnesses.2
In United States v. Agurs, discussed supra in Part I, the Supreme
Court addressed the scope of disclosure, expressly admonishing that any
errors should be made on the side of disclosure:
Because we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard,
and because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom
be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure.247
Citing Agurs, the Supreme Court in Kyles furnished prosecutors with
a reminder that convictions will be reversed for failure to comply with
the Brady dictates, under a broader standard of materiality than urged
and used by the United States in many cases in this district.248
In Kyles, discussed in Part III, which involved the government's duty
to turn over potentially exculpatory material pursuant to Brady, the
Supreme Court discussed at great length a prosecutor's duty under
Brady, and the critical concomitant duty to personally become aware of
any such material in the possession of other government actors. 24 9 The
court wrote: "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police. "2
The State of Louisiana argued in Kyles that a prosecutor cannot be
held responsible to turn over Brady material in possession of the police
but of which he is not personally aware. The court rejected that
argument focusing on the personal duty of the individual prosecutor and
stated:
To accommodate the State in this manner would, however,
amount to a serious change of course from the Brady line of
cases. In the State's favor it may be said that no one doubts that
police investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all
they know. But neither is there any serious doubt that
"procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the
246. See United States v. Seiyo, 514 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosner,
516 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Stroop, 121 F.R.D. 269 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
247. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,108 (1976).
248. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433 n.7, 439 (1995).
249. See id. at 432-33, 437.

250. Id. at 437-38.
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prosecutor's] burden and to insure communication of all relevant
information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.
Since, then, the prosecutor has the means to discharge the
government's Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for
excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not know
about boil down to a plea to substitute the police for the
prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final
arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.f 1
The court concluded that "[t]his means, naturally, that a prosecutor
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable
piece of evidence... This is as it should be." 2
Justice Souter's discussion of the importance of the prosecutor's
personal duty to comply with the government's Brady obligations
indicates that any delegation by the prosecutor would undermine the
government's duty under Brady, as none of the people conducting a
review of agency files have any familiarity with the factual context of the
particular case in which the request is made. The court in Kyles stated:
"the character of a piece of evidence as favorable will often turn on the
context of the existing or potential evidentiary record."213 Quite clearly,
it is the United States attorney's office prosecuting the case, and only
that office, which is sufficiently familiar with the factual nuances of the
case and possible defenses to make the necessary judgment call on the
relevancy of material in the personnel files. A thorough reading of Kyles
in connection with the prosecutor's duty to learn of exculpatory and
impeachment material, should leave no doubt about where the burden
of providing Brady, Bagley and Giglio material lies. Accordingly, that
duty is non-delegable.2"
In fact, courts have reacted to the language regarding discovery
duties noted in Kyles to mean that a prosecutor must search agency
personnel files for material information and such information must be
turned over to the defense25 Recall the rule established in Kyles
251. Id. at 438.
252. Id. at 439.

253. Id.
254. Id. at 438.
255. See United States v. Lacy, 896 F.Supp 982, 984-86 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (U.S. attorney is
required to personally review personnel files of agents testifying at preliminary hearings
and/or at trial); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (The obligation
flows naturally that a prosecutor's interest is "not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done" and, therefore, the individual prosecutor "has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf....") (quoting Berger v. United
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concerning a prosecutor's duty to search agency personnel and other
files is not new."'
The Seventh Circuit, however, has not ruled directly on the issue
since Kyles was decided, but has determined that the prosecutor has no
affirmative duty to search files of agency personnel not directly involved
As noted supra, Morris involved the
with the prosecution team.2
defendants' argument that the prosecutors had a duty to discover
information in the hands of other government agencies that "at various
times conducted independent investigations of Germania's affairs." ' s
The court noted:
The district court was satisfied, as are we, that the prosecution
team, which included investigating officers and agents, had no
knowledge of the specific documents identified by defendants.
The prosecutors therefore had no affirmative duty to discover
those documents and to disclose them to defendants. 9
It is clear that the question presented in Morriswas the prosecutor's
duty to review files of agents and officers not part of the prosecution
team."' The court in Morris decided that neither Kyles nor Fairmancan
be read as imposing a duty "on the prosecutor's office to learn of
information possessed by other government agencies that have no
involvement in the investigation or prosecution at issue.,261
Notwithstanding the apparent divergence from the discovery duty
articulated in Kyles, the Seventh Circuit has ruled, however, that the
Brady obligation extends to members of the prosecution "team," which
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) and Kyles, 115 S.Ct. at 1567-68); United States v. Hankins, 872
F. Supp. 170, 172-73 (D.N.J. 1995) (prosecutors have an affirmative duty to search files
maintained by different branches of government closely aligned with the prosecutor in order
to fulfill its Brady obligation).
256. See United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (a prosecutor's
Brady obligation extended to a search for files in the possession of the local police
department); United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29,31 (9th Cir. 1991) ("the government has
a duty to examine personnel files upon a defendant's request for their production."); United
States v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386,391 (7th Cir. 1985) (a prosecutor's Brady obligation extended
to a search for a police officer's ballistic report); United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5th
Cir. 1973) (a prosecutor's Brady obligation extended to search for a personnel file of a post
office employee).
257. See United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1170 (7th Cir. 1996).
258. Id. at 1169-70.
259. Id. at 1170.
260. See id. at 1169-70.
261. Id. at 1169.
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includes the police and the DEA.262 The court noted that it has long
followed a rule similar to the one approved in Kyles that the Brady rule
is "violated, where the police, rather than prosecutors, are responsible
for the suppression of exculpatory information."2 63 Accordingly, the
prosecutor has a duty to examine agency personnel files for Brady
material, as such a duty is a logical extension of the language and
principles found in Kyles.'
The mandate of Kyles is not overemphasized. The analysis provided
in Part II provides ample evidence that the Ninth Circuit procedures
employed concerning the review and disclosure of information
contained in personnel files of agents and officers is consistent with the
Supreme Court's view of the meaning and application of Brady
disclosures to the defense. The analysis found in the Lacy case,
interpreting Kyles, illustrates the sagacity of having the prosecutor be
responsible for the review and assessment of agents' personnel files.m
Lacy involved a multi-defendant, multi-count drug trafficking case
where the court applied the holding in Kyles to the defense request that
agency personnel files be turned over to the defense.2 The court in
Lacy held that a prosecutor has a duty to personally review agency
personnel files based upon the holding in the Kyles case.' The court
reasoned that it is only the prosecutor "prosecuting the case... which is
sufficiently familiar with the factual nuances of the case and possible
defenses to make the necessary judgment call on the relevancy of
material in the personnel files."m Since the individual prosecutor
ultimately is held responsible for turning over exculpatory material to
the defense, the prosecutor will at some point have to review materials
and make a decision about what should be turned over.m Kyles
provides that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police. " 270
Based upon this

262. See Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Young, 20 F.3d 758,764 (7th Cir. 1995).
263. Morris, 80 F.3d at 1169 (citing United States v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386,391 (1985)).
264. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-39.
265. See United States v. Lacy, 896 F.Supp. 982, 983-86 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
266. See id. at 983.
267. See id. at 985.
268. Id. (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438).
269. See id. at 986.
270. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (quoted in Lacy, 896 F.Supp. at 986; United States v. Hanna,
55 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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pronouncement, the Lacy court noted:
A thorough reading of Kyles should leave no doubt about where
the burden of providing Brady, Bagley, and Giglio material lies,
and that it is non-delegable. v2 Therefore, under the United States
Constitution, the prosecution has the burden of searching the
agency personnel files in order to "vindicate fundamental due
process rights."'m
The Ninth Circuit, however, clarified the procedure existent in that
circuit relative to the government's duty to examine agency personnel
files for exculpatory material. In United States v. Herring, the Ninth
Circuit held that a district court judge may not order a prosecutor to
personally examine the personnel files of cooperating agency
employees.27 The holding in Herring did not obviate the rule in the
Ninth Circuit, established in Henthorn, that the government has a duty
to review agency personnel files upon request and there is no
requirement of materiality. ' 4
The remaining question for not only this analysis, but also across the
federal circuits, is not whether the government should be burdened with
searching agency personnel files, but who should conduct the review.
The foregoing argument suggests that the prosecutor has the duty in
light of Kyles and its progeny. The alternative is to require an in camera
review of the files or to require the government to conduct the review of
personnel files of agents and officers directly involved in the
investigation. Notwithstanding the potential administrability problems
that may result with such a procedure, an examination of experience in
the Ninth Circuit reveals no significant administrative difficulties that
render such a procedure prohibitive 5
The Lacy case provides
compelling reasons why such a rule is appropriate in upholding the
dictates of Brady:
Adopting the lexicon in Kyles, the situation as it exists under
Jennings is like a ship captain anxious about tacking too close to
the wind, but who must rely entirely on landbound compatriots
271. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. at 986.
272- Id.
273. 83 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1996).
274. United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.
Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29,30-31(9th Cir. 1991)).
275. See Wiehl, supra note 7.
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to tell him the windspeed and directionals. Without ship's
compass, radar or other instruments, the vessel is not seaworthy.
If the information from shore proves insufficient, the mythical
captain may suffer no more than the indignity of a rude dip in the
water; a criminal defendant, on the other hand, has a great deal
more at stake.Y
The court reasoned that the person who is ultimately responsible
and who is most intimately familiar with the facts of the case should
bear the burden of conducting the search.m The court noted:
[T]his court reads Kyles as holding that our constitution places
the burden squarely on the prosecutor, not on agency clerks,
functionaries and non-prosecuting attorneys who may have no
trial experience, who have no knowledge of the facts and
intricacies of the particular case, and who are three thousand
miles away.'
If the Seventh Circuit rules that the prosecutors have an affirmative
duty to search agency personnel files, then the method of disclosure and
discovery is of great importance. Direct disclosure and discovery occurs
between the government and the defendants. As noted supra,however,
a district court could assure the impartiality and thoroughness of the
review procedure by an in camera review. Moreover, this procedure is
not new in federal district courts within the Seventh Circuit." It seems
logical that the prosecutor should conduct the review of the agency
personnel files. She will realize what is exculpatory and impeachment
material relative to the facts of the case. Alternatively, the issue to be
determined is one that may be best observed by a neutral arbiter (the
court or a magistrate judge) to determine whether the personnel files
contain evidence that would undermine the officers' credibility. It is
hard to place a finger on such materials if the viewpoint is that of an
advocate whose job is not combing documents for impeachment
material, but rather determining whether an officer has committed

276. Lacy, 896 F.Supp. at 986.

277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See United States v. Walker, No. 96-CR-226 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (Judge Rudolph T.
Randa conducted an in camera review of an agent's personnel file upon the government's
disclosure that it learned during the trial of a potential discovery matter within the ambit of
Kyles and recommended that an in camerareview be conducted by the court).

2000] AGENT PERSONNEL FILES AND FEDERAL DISCOVERY

593

perjury. Similarly, there is an institutional bias. Impeachment material
affecting credibility can and should include whether the officer has
engaged in shading of the truth, "mischaracterizations" of fact short of
perjury, or improper police practices, or if an agent or officer failed to
accurately characterize statements of the informant.
Another option is to order that the files of law enforcement officers
be examined by the appropriate agency's attorney or his staff. The
agency legal staff will notify the federal prosecutor assigned to the case
if any potential Brady material is found. The prosecutor could then
determine whether the information should be disclosed or whether a
review by the district court is appropriate. Defendants are likely to not
prefer this option for the obvious reason that it is hard to believe that an
agency's legal staff has any motive other than to hide material which the
defense should properly receive by "characterizing" them as nonexculpatory. While it is true that under Kyles, the prosecutor would be
charged with the Brady violation if exculpatory material was disclosed
later which was earlier withheld and reversal of a conviction could
result, it is hard to conceive of how suppression of evidence by an
agency's legal counsel would be uncovered.
Legal bases, apart from the constitutional arguments, exist that
support the imposition of a duty upon the prosecutor to examine
personnel files of agents and officers to discover impeachment material.
These grounds, while not exhaustive, are noted below.
B. Additional Legal Bases Supportingthe Rule Imposing a Duty upon
Prosecutorsto Search the PersonnelFiles of Agents and Officers for
Impeachment Material
1. The Wide Scope of Cross-Examination Necessitates That the Scope
of Disclosure Be Broad.
Disclosure of impeachment information is necessary to protect the
right of a defendant to confront, cross-examine, and impeach witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment. This right is a cherished one and remains
"the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the
truth of his [or her] testimony are tested."'
Cross-examination "in
matters relevant to credibility ought to be given wide scope."'" While a
trial judge has discretionary authority to restrict the scope of cross280. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,316 (1974).
281. United States v. Williams, 592 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United
States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983).
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examination, "this discretionary authority... comes into play only after
there has been permitted as a matter of sufficient cross-examination to
satisfy the Sixth Amendment."2 The defendant has a right to present a
complete defense.8
2. The Requested Records and Information Must Also Be Disclosed
Because Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Admissible
Impeachment Information Includes Opinion and Reputation Evidence,
Evidence of Specific Acts, and Evidence of Potential Bias.
Disclosure of material information contained in personnel files of
agents and officers is supported also by the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which allow impeachment through a variety of means.
For instance, Rule 608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits
the credibility of a witness to be attacked in the form of opinion or
reputation evidence. Judge Weinstein has clarified this rule, stating:
Rule 701... does not imposes [sic] formal prerequisites such as
long acquaintance or recent information about the witness.
Cross-examination can be expected to expose defects of lack of
familiarity and to reveal reliance on isolated or irrelevant
instances of misconduct or the existence of feelings of personal
hostility towards the principal witness." 4
Therefore, the requested information may well produce witnesses
who will have an opinion on, or know the reputation of, the officer in
question. Production of the requested information will provide counsel
with the opportunity to investigate the allegation or complaint made, as
well as providing witnesses who may testify on matters covered by Rule
608(a).
Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits inquiry on
cross-examination into specific instances of misconduct of the testifying
282. Green v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v.
Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 858 n.12); see also United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 437 (1st Cir.
1982) (any exercise of discretion limiting cross-examination must be informed by the utmost
caution and solicitude for the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); United States v.
Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219, 1225 (1st Cir. 1977).
283. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR

THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 608.04, 608-25. See also United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d
1374, 1382 (11th Cir. 1981) (finding that the trial court committed reversible error by
excluding opinion testimony the 11th Circuit stated, "foundation of long acquaintance is not
required for opinion testimony." Id. at 1382 (citing WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE)).
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witness which relate to his or her character trait for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. The categories of records and information that would
be material relate to the truthfulness or untruthfulness of agents and
officers. As such, disclosure of agents' personnel files is required. This
would also include, for example, disclosure of any allegations of failure
to collect potentially exculpatory evidence. It follows that if the officer
has, or is alleged to have committed acts reflecting negatively on his or
her credibility, he or she may be conducting himself or herself similarly
in this case. Therefore, the defense is entitled to receive and investigate
such allegations or acts.
Instances of prior misconduct by a witness often will be relevant to
his or her bias or motive to testify in such a manner in the current
proceeding. It is well-recognized that "bias of a witness is not a
collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a
witness has a motive to testify falsely."m The introduction of extrinsic
evidence to show bias is allowed even when the evidence is also relevant
to character which cannot be proved by extrinsic facts.M
By way of example, in United States v. Garrett,the Court examined
the disclosure of an officer's personnel file and related records of the
officer's disciplinary proceedings.2 In Garrett,cross-examination of the
officer had been restricted and production of the personnel records was
limited. The Garrettcourt found both actions improper, noting:
[T]he trial judge was too restrictive in his limitation of crossexamination in the present case .... Furthermore, there is no
way to determine whether other facts might have been disclosed
by an examination of [Officer] Lehman's disciplinary
proceedings which would be the possible basis for reasonable
inferences of bias or an interest in the outcome of the Garrett
prosecution. [Officer] Lehman might well have looked upon a
successful prosecution of Garrett as a means of having his
suspension lifted and being returned to full duty as a police

285. United States v. James, 609 F.2d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing United States v.
Harvey, 547 F.2d 720,722 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Blackwood, 456 F.2d 526,
530 (2d Cir. 1972) ("A defendant's major weapon when faced with inculpatory testimony of
an accusing witness often is to discredit such testimony by proof of bias or motive to falsify.
Evidence of such matters is never collateral.., for if believed it colors every bit of testimony
given by the witness whose motives are bared." Id. at 530).
286. See Beaudin v. United States, 360 F.2d 417, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1966); see also
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: UNrrED STATES RULES 607.03,607-24, n.4.
287. 542 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1976).
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officer.'
Garrett illustrates that the disciplining of a police witness constitutes
evidence of bias creating a potential motive to lie and is therefore the
proper subject of disclosure and cross-examination.m The underlying
facts of such discipline must be disclosed, especially where they relate to
issues and personalities in the case at hand.2 ' Accordingly, Garrett
further supports the disclosure of impeachment information.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has shown how the issue of disclosure of personnel files
in federal criminal cases arises in several settings. What is apparent is
that there is a lack of transparency in applying the dictates of Brady
between the Ninth Circuit and its sister circuits. This author has
attempted to show why the Ninth Circuit approach should be favored
over the more widely adopted materiality approach that is controlling in
most federal circuits including the Seventh Circuit.
The argument is supported by showing that Kyles and Morris can be
fairly read to mean that the prosecutor has a continuing duty to learn of
exculpatory or impeachment material contained in the personnel files of
agents that are members of the investigation team. Moreover, these
opinions suggest that the defendant does not bear the burden of
showing how the information contained in those personnel files are
material to the defense. While the prerequisite that the defendant
demonstrate the materiality of evidence contained in such files is the
rule in the Seventh Circuit in so far as Andrus and Navarro remain good
law, it is clear that both Kyles and Morris contravene that standard.
Moreover, there exist independent standards from the constitutional
requirement that prosecutors turn over impeachment material to the
defense derived from Brady and its progeny as outlined above. The
foregoing principles strongly suggest that the adoption of the Ninth
Circuit approach in the Seventh Circuit is compelling in order to
maintain the important due process rights of defendants in criminal
cases.

288. Id. at 26.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 26-27 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).

